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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme
Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals by order
dated April 7, 1993.

(R. 0651)

This Court has jurisdiction under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The primary issue on this appeal is as follows:
Did

the

trial

court

err

in granting

summary

judgment

against Mrs. Davis who, after nearly five years, had failed to adduce
any medical expert testimony that the iron in question had proximately caused her dermatitis?
Subsidiary issues are:
(1)

Did the trial court err in refusing to compel Black

and Decker to perform analyses to determine the chemical composition
of each and every component of Black and Decker's product?
(2)
affidavit

Did the trial court err in refusing to strike the

of Dr. Leonard J.

Swinyer, Black

and Decker's

expert

witness, who rendered his opinion that the Black and Decker iron was
not the cause of Mrs. Davis' problems?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is proper when pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file show no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Appellate courts review the trial
1

court's actions under a correctness standard giving no deference to
the trial court's conclusion that facts are not in dispute or to the
trial court's legal conclusions.
P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991).

Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821
Doubts or uncertainties concerning

issues of fact properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be
drawn from the facts are to be construed in a light favorable to the
party opposing the motion.

Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172

(Utah 1983). However, bare allegations unsupported by facts raise no
material issues. Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P. 2d 445, 446
(Utah App. 1989).
B.

Discovery Rulings.
Appellate

courts

recognize

that

the

trial

court

has

considerable latitude in discovery matters and therefore accord
deference to the trial court's rulings.

Reviewing courts will

interfere with the trial court's discovery rulings only where the
trial court has abused its discretion. Schonev v. Memorial Estates,
Inc. , 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah App. 1990); State, Road Commission, v.
Petty, 412 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah 1966); Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992).
C.

Expert Testimony.
The trial court has considerable discretion in determining

whether an expert is qualified to give an opinion. Reviewing courts
reverse only where the trial court has abused its discretion. Wessel
v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985); Maltbv v.

2

Cox Construction Co. , Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 340 (Utah 1979); Utah Dept.
of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 1984) ,
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of Case.
This is a rather unusual product liability action wherein

Mrs. Davis seeks damages for contact dermatitis allegedly caused by
a Black and Decker iron.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Mrs. Davis filed her complaint on December 20, 1989,

alleging an injury occurring in December, 1987.

(R. 0002, 006-007)

On August 6, 1992, Black and Decker moved for summary
judgment on the basis that there was nothing in the record to support
Mrs. Davis' allegations as to causation.

(R. 0357-0376) Mrs. Davis'

treating physicians had testified during discovery that they could
not causally connect the Black and Decker iron with Mrs. Davis' skin
problems.

(R. 0693, pp. 19-22; R. 0694, p. 8) Dr. Leonard Swinyer,

Black and Decker's expert, concluded that the likely cause of Mrs.
Davis' problems was formaldehyde resin used in the manufacture of her
clothing.

(R. 0373-0376)
Despite the fact that she and her husband (who is also her

attorney) had first suspected the iron in December, 1987 (R. 004,
007), Mrs. Davis through her counsel nonetheless acknowledged both
before and at the 1992 hearing on the motion that Mrs. Davis had no
medical evidence connecting the iron to her dermatitis.
0610)
3

(R. 0386,

The trial court entered summary judgment on October 14,
1992.

(R. 0593-0594)

1992.

(R. 0595)

C.

Mrs. Davis filed this appeal on November 9,

Statement of Facts.
1.

On December 17, 1987, plaintiff purchased a Black and

Decker Classic metal iron.
2.

(R. 0019)

Mrs. Davis alleges in this action that when she clean-

ed the iron prior to using it, it emitted toxic fumes. Furthermore,
she avers that the toxic fumes not only caused her to have a panic
attack but also contaminated her skin.
3.

(R. 0019-0021, 0695 p. 25-26)

Mrs. Davis also claims that the iron contained toxic

chemical residues that were pressed into her clothing, further
contaminating her skin.
4.

(R. 0022)

Plaintiff claims that as a result of her contact with

the iron, all fabrics that touch her skin cause her to have reactions.

(R. 0695 p. 65)
5.

Mrs. Davis also asserts that she was forced to spend

at least one-half of every day naked because the iron made it
impossible for her to wear most clothing.
6.

(R. 0695, p. 65)

Mrs. Davis continued to use the iron for approximately

two and one-half years, despite her claimed belief that the chemicals
from the iron were causing her skin condition.
7.

(R. 0695, p. 47)

On February 5, 1988, Mrs. Davis began seeing Dr. Leo

Sotiriou, a physician who had been practicing as a dermatologist for
ten years.

(R. 0693, pp. 4-6; R. 0695, p. 67)

4

8.

Dr.

Sotiriou

diagnosed

contact

dermatitis

possible atopic eczema and strongly recommended
undergo patch testing.
9.

with

that plaintiff

(R. 0693, pp. 13, 18-19)

Dr. Sotiriou understood that plaintiff did not follow

his recommendation to receive the patch testing, despite the fact
that at least two other doctors had also recommended patch testing.
(R. 0693, p. 19)
10.

Dr. Sotiriou stated that he had not found any medical

authority to support Mrs. Davis' claims that the Black and Decker
iron caused her problems. Consequently, Dr. Sotiriou was not willing
to state that the iron was responsible for her alleged injuries.
(R. 0693, pp. 19-22)
11.

On July 10, 1989, Mrs. Davis went to Dr. Kristin M.

Leiferman at the Mayo Clinic.
Davis

enter

the

hospital

Dr. Leiferman recommended that Mrs.

for

further

treatment

and

continued

evaluation. Mrs. Davis did not follow Dr. Leiferman's advice and did
not return to the Mayo Clinic.
12.

(R. 0694, Exhibit 5)

On September 6, 1989, Mrs. Davis saw Dr. John Joseph

Zone, the Chief of the Division of Dermatology at the University of
Utah Medical Center.
13.

(R. 0694, pp. 3, 4)

While reviewing Mrs. Davis' medical records, Dr. Zone

discovered that Mrs. Davis had been treated for identical contact
dermatitis bv Dr. Don Reese at the University of Utah Medical Center
on October 19, 1983, four years prior to purchasing the Black and
Decker iron.

Dr. Zone also discovered that Dr. Reese had scheduled

5

plaintiff for patch testing on November 9, 1983.
keep that appointment.
14.

Mrs. Davis did not

(R. 0694, pp. 11-24 and Exhibits 8-9)

Dr. Zone recommended that Mrs. Davis receive patch

testing and scheduled her for another appointment on September 13,
1989.

She

neither

returned

for

her

obtained the recommended patch testing.
15.

scheduled

appointment

nor

(R. 0694, pp. 26-28)

When asked if he had an opinion as to whether Mrs.

Davis' problems were related to the Black and Decker iron, Dr. Zone
stated his "tendency was to say that [the iron and the injuries] were
not related."
16.

(R. 0694, p. 8)
On February 5, 1991, Mrs. Davis was scheduled to see

Dr. Frances Storrs at Oregon State University Health Sciences in
Portland, Oregon.

Dr. Storrs is a specialist in contact dermatitis.

The medical evidence indicates that Mrs. Davis did not keep that
appointment.
17.
was

(R. 0695, pp. 70-71)
On February 25, 1992, under court order, Mrs. Davis

seen by Dr. Leonard

examination.

J.

Swinyer

for an

independent

medical

Dr. Swinyer is a board certified dermatologist and is

considered one of the leading experts in contact dermatitis and
contact eczema in Salt Lake City.
18.

(R. 0273, 0373-0374; Addendum 1)

Dr. Swinyer reviewed Mrs. Davis' medical records,

photographs she supplied, the depositions of Mrs. Davis, Dr. Zone and
Dr. Sotiriou, and a personal medical history written by Mrs. Davis.
(R. 0374)
19.

Dr. Swinyer conducted a thorough examination, and

determined Mrs. Davis7 skin was "clear and free of any of the skin
6

conditions."

Mrs. Davis told Dr. Swinyer that her skin had been

clear since June or July of 1991.
20.

(R. 0374-0375)

Based on his professional experience, his knowledge of

contact dermatitis and its causes, his examination of Mrs. Davis, and
the available medical, personal and legal records, Dr. Swinyer
expressed his opinion that "Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she
has described and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied),
were not the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from
the Black and Decker iron which she describes in her deposition."
(R. 0375)
21.

Dr. Swinyer also indicated that Mrs. Davis' "pre-

existing contact eczema and/or preexisting contact dermatitis may
have been produced by formaldehyde resin commonly found in some
fabrics used in women's clothing."

(R. 0375)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Entering Summary Judgment in View
of the Plaintiff's Failure to Present Any Medical Expert Testimony
Linking the Black and Decker Iron to her Skin Condition.
A major purpose of summary judgment is to allow the parties
to pierce the pleadings to determine if there are genuine issues of
fact to present to the factfinder.
such

as this, where

In a products liability action,

complex medical

and

technical

issues are

involved, Mrs. Davis was required to present expert testimony in
support of her contention that the iron caused her skin condition.
Once Black and Decker had demonstrated that there was no
expert testimony in the record supporting Mrs. Davis' allegations
regarding causation, Mrs. Davis could not merely rely on her bare
7

allegations but bore the burden of producing admissible expert
medical evidence supporting her theories in order to raise an issue
of material fact.

After nearly five years of accusing Black and

Decker of causing her injury, Mrs. Davis was unable to produce any
medical expert testimony supporting her allegations, and the trial
court properly entered summary judgment.
B.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Refusing to
Order Black and Decker to Perform Chemical Analyses of Each and Every
Component Part of its Iron.
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that trial courts
have broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters.

Black and

Decker disclosed all information it had respecting the components
used in the manufacture of the iron and names and addresses of the
third parties supplying those components.

Additionally, it volun-

teered to supply exemplars for Mrs. Davis' analysis. The trial court
did not err in refusing to order Black and Decker to go beyond the
information available to it and perform tests to obtain information
which the plaintiff could readily obtain by performing her own tests.
C.
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Strike the Affidavit
of Dr. Leonard Swinyer.
Mrs. Davis had to produce evidence to create a material
issue of fact, whether the court struck Dr. Swinyer's affidavit or
not.

However, the trial court properly refused to strike the

affidavit.
Expert witnesses can gain personal knowledge by personal
observation, reliance on the testimony of others, and sources relied
upon by other experts in the field.
8

Furthermore, an expert witness

is competent to testify if the trial court finds that the expert has
knowledge that can assist the trier of fact.

Since Dr. Swinyer's

affidavit met all these criteria, the trial court justifiably refused
to strike it.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff attempts to divert the Court's attention by
taking issue with the trial court's discovery rulings and the
adequacy of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit.

However, the overriding issue

on this appeal is whether the trial court properly entered summary
judgment in light of the plaintiff's lack of medical evidence to
support her claims. The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally stated
that one of the major purposes of summary judgment:
is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine
whether there is a genuine issue to present to
the fact finder.
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah
1984).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has also held that:
[t]he mere assertion that an issue of fact
exists without a proper evidentiary foundation
to support that assertion is insufficient to
preclude the granting of a summary judgment
motion.

Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) . This case presents
a classic example of a party who, when put to her proof, failed to
present

any

evidence

demonstrating

concerning causation.

9

a

material

issue

of

fact

Mrs. Davis erroneously argues that she bore no burden to
present evidence in response to Black and Decker's motion, because
Black and Decker's expert affidavit was deficient and the trial court
erred in its discovery rulings.

In the following paragraphs, Black

and Decker demonstrates that the law required Mrs. Davis to present
expert medical testimony to create a material issue of fact regardless of the adequacy of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit.

Furthermore, not-

withstanding her protestations to the contrary, the trial court
properly ruled on Mrs. Davis7 discovery requests and the sufficiency
of Dr. Swinyer's affidavit.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN VIEW OF MRS. DAVIS' FAILURE TO PRODUCE ANY
MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY SUPPORTING HER ALLEGATIONS
OF CAUSATION.

A.
Plaintiff Could Not Make A Prime Facie Case Against Black &
Decker For Negligence, Strict Liability or Breach of Warranty Because
Plaintiff Did Not Have A Medical Expert Witness.
Because this case presented highly technical questions of
medicine and chemistry that were beyond the sphere of the ordinary
juror, the plaintiff was obligated to provide an expert witness who
could establish causation.
firmly established.

The reasons for this requirement are

First, a defendant should not be required to

compensate a victim where there is no known scientific basis for her
claims and where those who are knowledgeable do not support her
contentions. Furthermore, courts have instituted this requirement in
certain

negligence

and

strict

liability

cases,

such

as those

involving complex medical issues, because juries need sound foundations for their decisions. Juries cannot be allowed to speculate and
10

must

limit

testimony.

their

consideration

to

facts

and

qualified

expert

To do otherwise would invite juries to base decisions on

conjecture, sympathy, and passion. Accordingly, the vast majority of
courts hold that a plaintiff must have competent, qualified expert
testimony when medical issues are involved.
Many

courts

extend

the

expert

requirement

to

actions

against any professionals such as engineers, architects, doctors and
lawyers, holding that the plaintiff is obligated to establish the
standard of care applicable to that profession and, through expert
testimony, to establish that the defendant's actions fell below that
standard of care.

See, e.g., Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct.App. 1987) (in medical malpractice
action, expert medical testimony required to establish causation);
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P. 2d 348

(Utah 1980)

(majority of medical

malpractice cases require expert testimony); Nauman v. Harold K.
Beecher & Associates, 467 P.2d 610 (Utah 1970) (breach of a standard
of care for architects requires expert testimony).
Likewise,

in

strict

liability

actions,

courts

have

consistently required that a plaintiff prove the existence of a
defect, the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product, and the
causative nexus to plaintiff's injuries by means of expert witnesses.
See Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) ; Lee v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 721 F.Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989); Aarnes v. Merck &
Co., 532 F.Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1980).
Under the circumstances of this case, the case law is clear
that plaintiff

was obligated

to present
11

expert

testimony.

For

example, in Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124

(2d Cir. 1991),

plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer of an fixation
device that had been inserted in her hip to aid in healing after a
fracture. Plaintiff asserted claims of negligent failure to warn and
strict liability for design defect.

The trial court granted a

directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer stating that plaintiff
had failed to prove causation because plaintiff had presented no
expert medical testimony.

In affirming the trial court, the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
"[t]he issue of causation in such a complicated
medical case, therefore, was one beyond the
sphere of the ordinary juryman and required
expert testimony. . . . Absent competent medical
expert testimony on the issue of causation, the
[plaintiff] could not prove the elements of a
cause of action based in strict products
liability or negligence.
Fane, 927 F.2d at 131, 132.
Similarly, in Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F.Supp.
89 (D.Md. 1989), plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of
a breast implant prosthesis, alleging negligence, strict liability,
and breach of warranty when the implant ruptured requiring surgical
intervention.

The manufacturer moved for, and was granted, summary

judgment. After ruling that plaintiff had not identified the defendant as the manufacturer of the ruptured prosthesis, and that she
failed to establish the elements of failure to warn, the court then
directed its attention to the fact that plaintiff had not presented
any expert testimony to support her allegations stating:
In order to prove her claims of negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty, plaintiff must produce evidence that the implants
12

were defective and that the defect was the
proximate cause of her injury. The testimony of
an expert witness is indispensable in product
liability cases when the subject of the inference is so particularly related to some science
or profession that it is beyond the ken of the
ave raae 1avman.
Lee, 721 F.Supp. at 95 (quoting Virgil v. "Kash N' Karry" Service
Corp. , 484 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct.App. 1984) (emphasis added) .

The Lee

court further observed:
The interaction of a breast prothesis with the
human body raised technical questions requiring
expert testimony. . . .
In the absence of
expert testimony, the evidence does not permit
an inference that the leak was caused by a
defect. . . . It is insufficient to rely merely
on the occurrence of the rupture to show a
defect.
Proof of a defect in a products
liability case must rise above speculation and
recovery cannot be predicated on a presumption
from the mere happening of an accident.
Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
As opposing counsel conceded to the trial court (R. 0386,
0610), expert testimony was likewise needed in the case at hand. The
interaction between the iron and plaintiff's skin raised complex
medical and chemical issues. It would have been highly unreasonable
to expect the average juror to understand and appreciate the complexities of the plaintiff's medical condition without guidance from a
dermatologist. It would have been equally unreasonable to expect the
average juror to make the connection between the iron and the plaintiff's alleged injuries without the expertise of a physician who
could explain causation.

In sum, it would have been impossible for

the average juror to have any appreciation or understanding of this
area of medicine without competent explanations from those who so
13

understand.

Furthermore, the plaintiff could not ask a jury to

simply speculate on causation because she alleged that she suffered
injury.

At trial she would have had to present qualified and

competent expert testimony to support her claims.
B.
Mrs. Davis Bore the Burden of Presenting Experts in Response to
the Motion Regardless of the Sufficiency of Dr. Swinyer's Affidavit.
Both before and during the hearing on Black and Decker's
motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Davis' counsel readily admitted
that Mrs. Davis was

legally obliged

to demonstrate

by expert

testimony that there was a causative link between the Black and
Decker iron and Mrs. Davis' skin problems. Furthermore, she admitted
she had no such evidence.

(R. 0386, 0610)

Nonetheless, Mrs. Davis

argued below and continues to argue here that even though she did not
present expert testimony, there was a material issue of fact which
precluded summary judgment. Mrs. Davis mistakes the burden she bears
in responding to a motion for summary judgment.
Mrs. Davis' argument is almost identical to that made by a
plaintiff in a products liability action ultimately rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In Celotex. the plain-

tiff brought a wrongful death action against Celotex Corporation and
others alleging that her decedent and been exposed to unreasonably
dangerous

asbestos products.

After approximately

one year of

discovery, Celotex brought a motion for summary judgment on the basis
that the plaintiff had been unable to produce any evidence demonstrating that Celotex's product had caused the decedent's death. The
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trial

court

rendered

summary

judgment, but

the

circuit

court

reversed, holding that Celotex had not supported its motion in the
form of affidavits or otherwise.

The United States Supreme Court

subsequently reversed the Court of Appeals, stating:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no
genuine issue as to any material fact," since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2552. The Supreme Court further
noted the moving party's burden:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment
always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any," which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. But unlike the Court of Appeals,
we find no express or implied requirement in
Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion
with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim. [Emphasis by the
Court.]
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

Hence, under the

federal rules, a plaintiff must respond to a motion for summary
judgment if the defendant has brought to the court's attention, by
way of affidavit or simply by reference to the record, that there is
no evidence concerning an element of the plaintiff's case upon which
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the plaintiff bears the burden at trial.

If the plaintiff fails to

present evidence, summary judgment is appropriate.
The courts in other states have readily applied the Celotex
reasoning

to their own rules.

For example, in Young v. Key

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 770 P.2d 182, 187 (Wash. 1989), the Washington
Supreme Court stated:
In a summary judgment motion, the moving party
bears the initial burden of showing the absence
of an issue of material fact. If the moving
party is a defendant and meets this initial
showing1, then the inquiry shifts to the party
with the burden of proof at trial, the plaintiff. If, at this point, the plaintiff "fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial," then the trial
court should grant the motion. In Celotex, the
United States Supreme Court explained this
result: "In such a situation, there can be 'no
genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."
x

The moving party may meet the initial burden
by "' showing' --that is, pointing out to the
district court--that there is an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party's
case." [Citations omitted.]
The Colorado Supreme Court similarly followed Celotex in Continental
Airlines,

Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d

708, 712-713

(Colo. 1987),

observing:
Whenever summary judgment is sought, the moving
party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for his motion
and identifying those portions of the record and
of the affidavits, if any, which he believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. In a case where a party moves
for summary judgment on an issue on which he
16

would not bear the burden of persuasion at
trial, his initial burden of production may be
satisfied by showing the court that there is
absence of evidence in the record to support the
nonmoving party's case.
Once the moving party has met this initial
burden of production, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to establish that there is a
triable issue of fact. If the non-moving party
cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out a
triable issue of fact on his claim, a trial
would be useless and the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
[Citations omitted.]
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly adopted Celotex.
Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 768 P.2d

See,

768, 772

(Idaho 1989); Goradia v. Hahn Co.. 810 P.2d 798, 800 (N.M. 1991);
Bacon v. Mercy Hospital of Fort Scott, Kansas, 756 P.2d 416, 419
(Kan. 1988); and Orme School v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. 1990).
Although this Court has not expressly discussed Celotex in
the exact context presented here, it has nonetheless cited Celotex
for the proposition that a court must consider each element of the
non-moving party's claim and that a non-moving party's failure of
proof concerning one essential element of the party's case renders
other facts immaterial.
Inc. , 740

P.2d

See, Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care,

262, 264

(Utah App.

1987)

and

Reeves

v. Geicry

Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah App. 1988) .
The case law overwhelmingly supports the proposition that
a plaintiff must respond to a motion for summary judgment in the
circumstances presented here. If the plaintiff fails to produce this
evidence, summary judgment is appropriate.

Even if this Court were

to determine that Dr. Swinyer's affidavit was inadmissible, Black and
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Decker nonetheless carried its burden of demonstrating through record
evidence of Mrs. Davis' own treating physicians that there was no
evidence supporting Mrs. Davis' contentions.

In view of Mrs. Davis'

failure to present expert testimony supporting a causative link, the
trial court necessarily was obligated to enter summary judgment.
II.

JUDGE MOFFAT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO FORCE BLACK AND
DECKER TO PERFORM THE PLAINTIFF'S TESTING.
Mrs. Davis questions the trial court's authority to manage

discovery in this case.
and

Decker

answered

Specifically, she argues that since Black

her

third

set

of

interrogatories

without

objection, the trial court had no discretion thereafter and was
obliged to order production of all information Mrs. Davis demanded.
This argument is specious and contrary to well-established case law.
In State, Road Commission v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914, 17 Utah
2d 382 (1966) , the Utah Supreme Court observed that discovery can be
taken to extremes:
The idea of making a lawsuit a game of tricks by
keeping information secret to surprise the
opposition at a critical moment is more suited
to the fictionalized drama of stories and plays
than to actual trials in a court of justice.
Yet the evil to be apprehended in permitting the
use of discovery to be carried to an opposite
extreme must also be guarded against. One party
may sit idly by while the other prepares its
case with zeal and diligence and then attempt to
take advantage of this industry by simply asking
for information, the acquisition of which may
have involved a great deal of time, effort and
expense.
The possibility of unfairness is
plainly evident*
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Petty, 412 P.2d at 917. Due to the possibility of abuse in either of
these situations, the Supreme Court noted the unique role played by
the trial courts in achieving a proper balance:
The question as to whether interrogatories are
subject to objection as violating that rule or
for other reasons is primarily for the trial
court to determine. Because of this fact and
his advantaged position in proximity to all
aspects of the lawsuit, it is practical and
desirable that he be allowed considerable latitude of discretion in his rulings thereon which
should have the purpose of avoiding extremes
mentioned above and conforming within the rule
just quoted, while permitting the proceeding to
move forward with such efficiency and expedition
as may be achieved consistent with the proper
safeguard of the rights of the parties in the
particular circumstances.
Petty, 412 P.2d at 918. This Court has also recognized the special
management role a trial court plays and has reiterated that the trial
court has broad latitude and discretion in discovery rulings.

In

Schonev v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah App.
1990), this court noted:
Management of the actions pending before it is
uniquely the business of the trial court and
while an appellate court may, of course, intervene if discretion is abused, we accord trial
courts considerable latitude in this regard and
considerable deference in their determinations
concerning discovery.
The record amply demonstrates that Judge Moffat's rulings on the
sufficiency of Black and Decker's answers to Mrs. Davis' third set of
interrogatories was eminently reasonable and achieved an appropriate
balance between the interests of the parties.
Black and Decker was not aware of the chemical composition
of all of the components supplied by third party manufacturers used
19

in the assembly of the iron. Black and Decker did supply what information it had, even offering to provide samples for Mrs. Davis'
analysis.

(R. 0245-0247)

Facing the prospect of the costs associ-

ated with performing these chemical analyses, Mrs. Davis apparently
determined that Black and Decker should be required to obtain this
information for her and sought the court's assistance in ordering
Black and Decker to "account for each and every chemical used in 'The
Classic' metal steam iron."

(R. 0280)

However, the trial court,

after a hearing, only required Black and Decker to supply the
information it had already offered including disclosing the chemicals
and compounds which were known to it and providing the names and
addresses of the third-party suppliers, which may have additional
information. When Mrs. Davis repeatedly questioned the trial court's
ruling, insisting that Black and Decker provide additional information, the trial court finally lost patience reprimanding Mrs. Davis'
counsel:
For some reason the plaintiff has some difficulty in understanding the extent and nature to
which discovery must be responded. Parties are
not required to do the legal work for other
parties nor are they required to seek out information that can just as easily be obtained by
the party asking for the discovery. (R. 0354a)
Although Mrs. Davis contends on this appeal that the trial
court erred, the very case upon which she relies, Trane Co. v.
Klutznick, 87 F.R.D. 473 (D.C.W.D. Wis. 1980), states that a party is
not required to search out new information, but only must provide the
information which it has. Black and Decker complied with this rule.
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The trial court achieved an appropriate balance between the
parties--ordering Black and Decker to disclose the information it had
but not requiring Black and Decker to expend the time, effort and
expense of going beyond that information solely for the plaintiff's
benefit.

Clearly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
It is particularly ironic that the plaintiff would accuse

Black and Decker of being uncooperative in discovery in this case.
In spite of the clear requirements of Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, plaintiff refused to allow Black and Decker to inspect the
iron in question, forcing a motion and order on the issue.
0058, 0158)

(R. 0057-

Furthermore, contrary to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, plaintiff refused to submit to an independent medical
examination, requiring another motion and order.

(R. 0263-0264,

0273) Ultimately, plaintiff's obstinacy in this case reached a level
where the court was required to impose sanctions.
III.

(R. 0354-0356)

THE SWINYER AFFIDAVIT COMPLIED WITH RULE 56(e),
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Mrs. Davis argues that the trial court erred in refusing to

strike the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, and therefore, the judgment must
be reversed.
motion

As previously noted in Point I, the moving party on a

for summary judgment need only draw the trial

court's

attention to an absence in the record of any evidence supporting an
element of the non-moving party's claim to shift the burden to the
non-moving party to produce evidence.

Black and Decker shifted the

burden to Mrs. Davis merely by informing the court that none of Mrs.
Davis' treating physicians supported her theory.
21

Black and Decker

additionally filed the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike it.
The applicable portion of Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, reads as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein.
Dr. Swinyer's affidavit fulfilled all three of these requirements:
(1) personal knowledge, (2) admissible facts, and (3) demonstrable
competency to testify.
A.

Dr. Swinver Had Personal Knowledge.
Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference
may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.

In interpreting a rule of evidence substantively identical to the
Utah and federal rules, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Gold Rush
Investments v. G.E. Johnson Construction, 807 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Colo.
App. 1990) noted the means by which an expert can gain "personal
knowledge" to testify:
CRE 703 incorporates three methods by which an
expert may acquire knowledge of the facts upon
which his opinion will be predicated. Under the
first method, the expert may gather information
through firsthand observation.
The second
method allows the expert to base his testimony
upon facts presented at trial, either in the
form of hypothetical questions propounded by
22

counsel or by way of the evidence presented to
the trier of fact. The third method permits an
expert to rely on facts outside the record which
are not personally observed, but which are of
the type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the same field.
11 Moore's Federal Practice
§ 703.02 (2d ed. 1989)
Dr. Swinyer's affidavit demonstrates that he had "personal knowledge," having obtained the information through the means recognized
by the courts.
Dr. Swinyer acquired some of the facts upon which he based
his opinion through his personal examination of Mrs. Davis.

He

obtained other information through an interview with Mrs. Davis and
reviewing the deposition testimony of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone.

He

additionally reviewed medical records maintained by Dr. Sotiriou, Dr.
Zone, the University of Utah Dermatology Clinic, the University of
Utah ObGyn Department, Dr. Glen Lund and photographs supplied by Mrs.
Davis.

(Addendum 1)

All of these methods are recognized as

appropriate means by which an expert may acquire knowledge necessary
to support an expert opinion.
B.
All of the Facts Upon Which Dr. Swinver Based His Opinion Are
Admissible in Evidence.
There is nothing in Dr. Swinyer's affidavit that could not
be entered

into evidence had this matter proceeded

to trial.

Obviously, Dr. Swinyer's personal observations of the plaintiff are
admissible.

Mrs. Davis' statements to Dr. Swinyer would be admis-

sible as admissions.

Drs. Sotiriou and Zone would be available to

testify either personally or through deposition.
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Given appropriate

foundation, all the medical records and the photographs would be
admissible as exhibits.
C.

Dr. Swinyer Was Competent to Testify as an Expert Witness.
In Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253

(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the trial court's
latitude and the appropriate criterion it should use to determine the
competency of an expert witness:
A trial court, whether acting as the trier of
fact or presiding at a jury trial, is granted
considerable discretion in determining whether
an expert is qualified to give an opinion on a
particular matter. * * * The critical factor
in determining the competency of an expert is
whether that expert has knowledge that can
assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues
before it.
Dr. Swinyer was eminently qualified to testify as an
expert.

He is a medical doctor specializing in dermatology and is

board certified not only in dermatology but also dermatopathology.
His practice emphasizes contact dermatitis and contact eczema, and he
is considered one of the leading experts in the Salt Lake City area.
(R. 0373-0374, H1 1-3)

Based on his formal training and experience,

Dr. Swinyer is competent to testify on the origins of contact
dermatitis and is qualified to determine based on medical records and
histories, the likelihood that any particular source is the cause of
a contact dermatitis.
Dr. Swinyer noted that Mrs. Davis had had contact eczema/
contact dermatitis prior to the date of purchase of the Black and
Decker iron.

(R. 0375, 1 9)

Furthermore, Mrs. Davis had informed

him that her skin condition had resolved spontaneously in June or
24

July, 1991.

(R. 0375, 1 7) 1 Dr. Swinyer further noted that the pre-

existing contact eczema was produced by formaldehyde resins commonly
found in fabrics in women's clothing.

(R. 0375, % 10) Based on this

evidence, he concluded that the iron did not cause her dermatitis.
Although Mrs. Davis claims that Dr. Swinyer was not
competent to testify, the argument is nothing more than an attack on.
Dr. Swinyer's credibility, calculated to divert attention from her
failure to support her allegations. The issue before the trial court
was not whether Dr. Swinyer's testimony was credible but whether Dr.
Swinyer was competent to testify. Clearly, Dr. Swinyer had knowledge
and experience sufficient to "assist the trier of fact" and was
therefore competent.

Hence, the trial court properly refused to

strike the affidavit.
CONCLUSION
In view of the record before the trial court negating any
causal connection between the iron and Mrs. Davis' skin condition,
and in view of Mrs. Davis' failure after nearly five years to obtain
expert testimony in support of her contentions, Rule 56, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, mandated that the trial court enter summary
judgment.

Judge Moffat reasonably exercised his discretion in

refusing to require Black and Decker to go beyond the information
available to it and perform testing of third party manufacturers'
products solely for the purpose of saving the plaintiff the expense
entailed in obtaining this information.
x

Furthermore, since Dr.

Mrs. Davis discontinued the use of the iron in the summer, 1990,
one year earlier than the period her skin resolved. (R. 0693, p. 47)
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Swinyer was eminently qualified to render his opinion, the trial
court did not err in refusing to strike the affidavit.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Black and Decker respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the trial court in all respects.
DATED this (p

day of October, 1993
CHRISTE:

OWELL, P.C.

jeryp/ cnrrstensei
DouglasBayly
Attoyo4eys for Defendants/Appellees
Brack and Decker
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

//T^day of October, 1993,

two true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEES BLACK AND
DECKER were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
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ADDENDUM 1
Affidavit of Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D.

Roger P. Christensen, #0648
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Black and Decker
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OL EVE L00MIS DAVIS,
AFFIDAVIT OF
LEONARD J. SWINYER, M.D.

Plaintiff,
vs.
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.)/ INC.,
(a Maryland corporation
authorized to do business in
the State of Utah, and a subi! sidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a
Maryland corporation,

Civil No. 89-0907651 CV
Judge Moffatt

Defendants.
'i

STATE OF UTAH

:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon
oath, do hereby testify as follows:
1.

I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology,

currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
2.
dermatopathology.

I

am

board

certified

in

dermatology

and

I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and
-1-

board certified in Dermatology since 1973.
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas.
4.

I was retained as a dermatology expert by the

attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct
a

dermatology

analysis

and

examination

plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis.

with

respect

to the

I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on

February 25, 1992.
5.
photographs

As

part

provided

dermatological

of my

in this

conditions

at

analysis
case
issue

by
in

I have
the

reviewed

plaintiff

this

case.

the

of the
I

also

interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the
written medical history she provided.

I have also reviewed the

following medical records and materials:
a.

Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou;

b.

Records of the University of Utah Dermatology

Clinic, Dr. John Zone;
c.

Records of the University

of Utah OB/GYN

Department;
d.

Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of

Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund;
e.
6.

The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone.

Based

on my

own examination,

as well

as the

statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was

"2"

n374

apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25,
1992), Mrs. Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided.
7.

Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear

last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It
is my

understanding

that

she

is

not

currently

taking

any

medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared.
8.
and

Based on my training and experience, my examination

interview of Mrs. Davis, my

review of the photographs,

depositions and medical records and the other information I have
been provided, as well as my professional judgment, it is my
opinion that Mrs. Davis7 skin conditions, (which she has described
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied), were not
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition.
9.

It

is apparent

from

the medical

records

and

depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she
purchased the Black & Decker iron.
10.

Based on the information which has been provided to

me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing.
-3-
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DATED this

TWJU/-

%

kp*il(

I

day of^Apr^l) 1992.

day

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1992.

of

U^4£/l P/A/uJ
N
otary P u b l i c ^
Notary
Residing at:
^^t\UJ^
My commission expires: [b~ (-tfji

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

* ?

;•'

-, O'
day of April, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J.
Swinyer, M.D. was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to:
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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ADDENDUM 2
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motioix^nd proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence," and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

